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SECOND-ORDER BENEFITS FROM
STANDARDS
FRANK PARTNOY *
Abstract: This Article contributes to the new governance literature by
analyzing how private parties profit from standards. Scholars previously
have focused on what I call "first-order" profits from the right to extract
rent directly from the ownership or application of standards. But some
parties also make "second-order" indirect profits by engaging in some
new enterprise not directly related to the value of the relevant standard.
For example, an accounting firm can offer lucrative consulting services
based on its reputation as a standard hearer. Second-order profits are
most substantial for strong form standards, which arise when the gov-
ernment designates a private entity as standard setter and assigns it the
task of enforcement and regulation. This Article suggests that the ques-
tion of whether such privatization is beneficial depends not only on
First-order rents, but also on second-order costs and benefits. I t consid-
ers two examples from the financial markets: over-the-counter deriva-
tives and credit rating agencies.
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the different ways private parties profit from
standards. Recently, scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to
public-private partnerships and the costs and benefits of delegating
regulatory authority to private entities) One consequence of this shift
in governance is that standards increasingly have a private nature.
The government designates private standard setters and embodies
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. I am grateful for comments
from Bill 131-anon, Larry Cunningham, Stacey Dugan, Mark Lemley, and Fred Yen.
I See generally Jody Freeman, The Privale Role in Public Governance, 75 N.V.U. L. REV. 543
(2000) (discussing private participation in governance and implications for administrative
law); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contem-
porary Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (discussing governance as a collaborative ef-
fort between the public and private sectors); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsoutring Government
Regulation, 53 1)uKs Li. 389 (2003) (analyzing the impact of private actors' involvements
in government regulation on transaction costs).
169
170	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 48:169
private standards in law. 2 Inevitably, these standard bearers seek to
profit from the privatization of standard setting.
This Article argues that the literature and policy regarding stan-
dards should distinguish between two different types of behavior.
First, parties might seek to extract rent directly from the ownership or
application of standards. For example, the owner of a standard might
extract financial gain by charging other parties to use copywrittcn ma-
terial, or the owner might profit by influencing the standard in a par-
ticular way. 1 label this type of direct standards-related activity a "first-
order" action. First-order activity relates primarily to the expected in-
come streams associated with the rights to use the relevant standards.
In general, first -order activities are direct attempts to monetize the
value of the intellectual property associated with standards.
In addition, parties might seek to exploit standards in a second
distinct way, by engaging in some new enterprise not directly related
to the value of the relevant standard. For example, firms might use
standards (1) to exploit informational asymmetries, (2) to profit from
regulatory entitlements, (3) to create ambiguities that enable them to
extract gains that otherwise would be captured by public entities, or
(4) to hold up downstream producers of' related products. 3
 I label
these types of indirect standards-related activities "second-order" ac-
tions.
I argue that this categorical distinction is useful, and that, al-
though the current scholarly literature focuses on first-order activities,
second-order activities are increasingly common. Whereas first-order
activities are reasonably straightforward and well understood, second-
order activities are more complex. From a policy perspective, the
general economic approach to first-order activities is to balance the
costs and benefits of standards, in line with traditional antitrust or in-
tellectual property law and economics. Second-order activities present
additional difficulties, however, and can generate costs that are not
offset by any benefit associated with ownership of the relevant stan-
dard.
One area in which second-order actions are particularly impor-
tant is financial markets. Financial market participants engage in first-
order actions, to be sure. For example, the intellectual property rights
2 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Co' Wight,
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2005) (creating a framework
for analyzing private standards "embodied" in public law).
3 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 4 (May 31,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, nuallakk at http://ssrn ,com/abstract=923468).
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associated with accounting standards resemble the rights associated
with copyrightable standards in other industries. Organizations seek-
ing profits from generally accepted accounting principles are, in part,
seeking the same kinds of expected income streams as organizations
seeking to profit from copyright.
However, first-order profits often are small relative to second-
order profits. For example, the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association ("ISDA") promulgates standards embodied in master
swap agreements and related definitions, and profits directly from
selling such agreements to end-users of swap products. ISDA member
firms profit far more, however, from certain indirect benefits associ-
ated with selling derivatives contracts in an unregulated private con-
tracting regime. For example, ISDA member firms benefit. more from
second-order profits associated with informational asymmetries than
from first-order profits associated with the direct value of the relevant
property rights.
Similarly, bond credit rating agencies establish standards for rat-
ing public debt issues and make those standards available at no direct
cost on their websitcs. It is the second-order benefits, not the first-
order benefits, that are the focus of credit rating agency activity. The
agencies extract very high economic rents from the outputs of the
standardization process, primarily through charging fees to debt issu-
ers, not investors. These fees are high due to regulatory licenses—in
other words, the rights of debt issuers to be in compliance with regu-
lations that depend on those agencies' ratings. Credit rating agencies
also profit indirectly from the creation of transactions designed to
take advantage of various aspects of the promulgated standards.
Financial actors also benefit from second-order profits associated
with the ambiguity of standards. Ambiguous financial standards gen-
erate little direct value ex ante, but the ambiguity is valuable from a
second-order perspective, ex post. Securities dealers and other finan-
cial intermediaries profit from such second-order factors. For exam-
ple, dealers profit from open-ended language in standard form con-
tracts because such language may be interpreted cx post under
circumstances that favor the dealers. Similarly, financial gatekeepers
can profit from standard form documents because the documents
leave important issues open to interpretation or litigation ex post.
In sum, the private benefits of standards are indirect in many ar-
eas of the financial markets. Participants benefit from standards, not
so much by extracting value from the intellectual property value of
the standard itself, but by leveraging the use of the standard to cap-
ture profits in other aspects of their business.
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This analysis suggests a further question: Do financial markets'
differ substantively from other markets in ways that make second-
order activities more important? Or, do second-order activities exist in
other areas, such that the analysis of standards in financial markets
might inform the analysis of the use of standards in non-financial ar-
eas? These are difficult questions. In general, scholarship addressing
standards has focused primarily on non-financial standards arising in
software, manufacturing, and other technology-driven non-financial
businesses. The literature has described and analyzed the intersection
between a wide range of private organizations and the intellectual
property rights associated with the standards governing those organi-
zations. 4
In a recent article, Professor Lawrence A. Cunningham examined
some aspects of financial markets in seeking to create a comprehen-
sive framework for assessing standards that are promulgated and
copyrighted by non-governmental organizations. 5 In the areas Profes-
sor Cunningham considered—including accounting principles, cor-
poration codes, and manuals for stock exchange listings—the actions
of financial market participants did not differ markedly from those of
participants in other economic contexts. Professor William Bratton
also has considered standards in the accounting context, where he
has favored rules over principles for a number of reasons. 6 This Arti-
cle examines some other ways private actors in the financial markets
have developed and profited from standards and explores whether
these findings generate any insights for the broader literature on
standards.
There are several reasons why financial markets might be differ-
ent in principle. Financial markets move very quickly, making it
difficult to extract first-order value from standards. Although there
has been a proliferation of intellectual property rights claims in the
financial markets, these rights do not generate a substantial share of
4 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting ()Ioniza-
tions, 90 CAI.. L. Rt:v. 1889 (2002) (analyzing intellectual property rules in standard-setting
organizations); Janice M. Mueller, Patenting Industry Standards, 34J. MARSHALL L. REV. 897
(2001) (discussing the assertion or patent rights over industry standards created by private
parties); Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Properly, 17
BERKELEY Teen. L.J. 1043, 1046 (2002) (arguing that owners of standards that create in-
teroperability "should be allowed to negotiate license fees with the patentee of an inven-
tion incorporated in the standard").
5 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 293.
° See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-adry and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles . Ver-
sus Rents, 48	 L. RE.v. 1023, 1036-37 (2003).
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financial actors' profits. Although the amount of money at stake in
financial markets is very substantial, perhaps more so than in any
other industry, the intellectual property component of standards is
relatively small.
The nature of the finance business differs as well. For many tech-
nology companies, standards arc inextricably bound with the value of the
underlying product. For instance, DVD production standards directly
affect the ability of the manufacturer to make money selling DVDs. The
same is true of software. En contrast, the direct benefits of standards to
financial firms are relatively small. For example, the move by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") to facilitate securities report-
ing with eXtensible Business Reporting Language ("XBRL") will benefit
analysts and investors directly by reducing the costs associated with ana-
lyzing financial statements. However, if moving to XBRL enables firms to
profit indirectly by selling securities at higher prices or earning addi-
tional fee income, those firms would embrace the new standards even if
they were not able to capture any first-order benefits.
Despite the fact that financial markets are somewhat unique, there
are some general conclusions one can draw from the second-order ac-
tions of financial market participants. In particular, this Article focuses
on "regulatory licenses," rights granted by the government to private
parties that enable those private parties to determine whether market
participants obtain gains or incur costs associated with standards. I ar-
gue that the "regulatory license" is a useful concept in other areas of
public-private governance outside finance.
Part I explores the differences between first-order and second-
order use of standards. It sets forth a framework for analyzing these
different, aspects of standards and emphasizes the analysis of regula-
tory licenses. Part lI presents some empirical evidence about how par-
ticipants in certain aspects of the financial marketsin particular, the
over-the-counter financial derivatives and bond credit rating busi-
nesses—have used standards, with a particular focus on second-order
standards.
1. FIRST-ORDER AND SECOND-ORDER USE OF STANDARDS
In this section, I review and assess Professor Cunningham's de-
scription of different types of standards. Although Professor Cun-
ningham and I disagree about the relative efficiency of strong form
standards, we agree in many areas and I believe his rubric is extremely
useful. This section also discusses the theory of "regulatory licenses"
and explains why this theory matters to the assessment of standards.
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A. Cunningham's Taxonomy of Standard Strength
Various scholars have developed taxonomies of standards. Profes-
sor Larry Cunningham has suggested that there are three types of
standards, depending on how the standards relate to public law. 7
Weak form standards make their way into law simply by being men-
tioned. 8
 For example, a court or legislature might point to private sec-
tor standard setters in justifying a particular holding or statute. Semi-
strong form standards make their way into law through formal adop-
tion. 9
 A court or government authority might notice that a private
standard setter has generated a useful approach or rubric, and might
explicitly adopt it. Strong form standards begin as a public pro-
nouncement and then essentially are forced into the private sector."
For instance, a court or legislature might explicitly designate a private
entity as standard setter and assign the task of government enforce-
ment and regulation to the private entity.
Professor Cunningham has suggested that the class of strong
form standards "appears likely to have few members at present, but
could become an increasingly appealing government policy option." 11
This suggestion deserves careful consideration. In my view, there are
potential problems associated with the explicit designation of a pri-
vate entity as a standard setter. 12
Specifically, strong form standards effectively give the private stan-
dard setter a monopoly. As with any monopoly, the grant tends to re-
duce the quantity and increase the price of the relevant product. Of
course, the cost associated with the grant of monopoly rent might be
offset by some benefit. A private standard setter might be superior to
a government standard setter, even after accounting for the monop-
oly. Still, it is important to consider the incentives for private parties
to engage in behavior to extract financial gain directly from these
grants. Such behavior would fall into the category of first-order activ-
7 Cunningham, 3UPlil note 2, at 297-99.
" Id. at 298.
9 Id.
1 ° Id. at 298-99.
it Id. at 299.
12 In Part II,
	 notes 40-66 and accompanying text, I describe some examples of
what I believe are strong kirni standards in the financial area. Government policy related
to strong form standards in these areas has been less than optimal. Both the over-the-
counter derivatives and credit ratings businesses illustrate some of the negative effects of
strong form standards,
Weak ri r s t -o rder Semi-strong first-order Strong ilist-order
Weak second-order Semi-strong second-order Strong second-order
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ity. Likewise, strong form standards also might be more likely to gen-
erate opportunities for second-order profits, as described below.
Before I discuss these arguments in greater detail, I want to em-
brace and amplify Professor Cunningham's classification by distin-
guishing between first-order and second-order profits with respect to
each type of standard. One might imagine a two-by-three grid, setting
forth six different types of use of standards.
Weak first-order activities generate direct profits from the recogni-
tion of standards in statutes or case law, just as semi-strong first-order
activities produce profit directly from the public adoption of standards.
Weak second-order activities and semi-strong second-order activities lev-
erage their recognition or explicit adoption into new indirect income
streams. Likewise, strong first-order activities generate direct monopoly
or oligopoly profit from the government-approved private standard,
while strong second-order activities in turn leverage that approval into
new indirect income streams.
Professor Cunningham provided several examples of how private
materials might become embodied in law following the weak form
route." For example, state legislatures might reference valuation
books on insured property as a basis for establishing insurance loss
payouts. 14 Or, a federal agency might reference medical coding sys-
tems as a basis for processing reimbursement requests."
Private actors might profit from weak form government adoption
of standards in two ways. First, they might charge higher prices or
provide a lower-cost product to profit from the enhanced value asso-
ciated with the standard. For instance, reference valuation books that
are used to establish insurance loss payouts are more valuable than
those that are not. Likewise, medical coding systems that are a basis
for processing reimbursement requests are more valuable than those
that arc not. A first-order response by private actors whose standards
are referenced in public law would be simply to charge purchasers of
their product a higher price.
13 Cunningham, supra note 2, at 334.
It Id.
15 id.
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Alternatively, or in addition, these private parties might take sec-
ond-order action. For example, they 'night use the same labels or
marketing approach for all of their products to convince customers
that all of their standards had been designated by the government—
not just the ones that were mentioned in statutes or cases. The bene-
ficiaries of weak form standards also might try to leverage the refer-
ences into ancillary businesses, such as consulting services regarding
insurance payouts or medical reimbursements. Or they might threaten
competing suppliers of similar products with litigation.
As a policy matter, governments should take into account the po-
tential for both first-order and second-order actions when deciding
whether to reference a particular private actor's standards. Put an-
other way, policymakers should consider the cost not only of the in-
creased price of the referenced standard, but spillover cost as well. It
might be the case that the benefits associated with a weak form stan-
dard exceed the costs, but it is important to account for all costs.
The distinctions between first-order and second-order actions
with respect to semi-strong standards also arc important. For example,
some legislative bodies have adopted private building codes formally,
rather than merely referring to them. Likewise, some federal statutes
direct agencies to incorporate private standards. Professor Cunning-
ham cites the Consumer Product Safety Act, which directs the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (the "CPSC") to adopt private
standards when possible and consistent with regulatory objectives. 16
The CPSC explicitly incorporated standards promulgated by private
organizations in its regulations governing the testing of bicycle hel-
mets. 17
How might a private party whose helmet testing standards were
adopted in semi-strong fashion achieve some financial gain? It might
simply charge more for its product. A safety test by this company
might cost substantially more than it had before the standards were
adopted in regulation. In addition, the private party might seek to
charge bicycle helmet manufacturers for advisory services regarding
compliance with testing. Or it might seek to profit from increased
sales related to its motorcycle helmet standards. Again, the distinction
between behavior directed to achieving direct benefits and behavior
intended to produce indirect benefits is important; government agen-
at 337.
17 See 16 C.F.k. 1203.3 (2006) (incorporating by reference the draft ISO/D1S 6220-
1983 standard from the 1nternatitmal Organization liar Standardization and recom-
mended practices from the Society of Automotive Engineers).
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cies should account for both when adopting standards promulgated
by private parties.
Filially, with respect to strong form standards, Professor Cunning-
ham points to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the
"PCAOB") as an example of the anointment of a non-governmental
strong form standard setter. 18 PCAOB accounting standards are incor-
porated into federal law, and the federal government has designated
the PCAOB as the exclusive source for standard setting in the account-
ing area.
However, the PCAOB is an unusual entity: it is a private not-for-
profit corporation Funded by federal government-mandated fees paid
by public companies and their auditors.ig Its annual budget is ap-
proved by the SEC and consists largely of personnel expenses. 20 i ts
operating revenues are derived almost entirely from the fees paid pur-
suant to federal government mandate. 2 ' In many respects, the
PCAOB acts as an instrumentality , of the federal government, al-
though it is not formally recognized as a federal agency. 22 In sum, be-
cause the PCAOB is a unique agency, it is not an exemplar for pur-
poses of analyzing the costs and benefits of strong form standards.
Arguably, it is not a strong form example at all.
Moreover, from a standards perspective, it is of crucial sig-
nificance that the PCAOB has adopted a policy that it will not bring
copyright infringement claims with respect to the publication, distri-
bution, or sale of its accounting standards that are incorporated into
federal law." In other words, the PCAOB's standards are publicly
available for free, not because it is a strong form type of standard set-
ter, but because it is a standard setter that makes its standards avail-
able for free pursuant to its unique relationship with the federal gov-
It "To date, PCAOB appears to be the sole example of a governmental standard setter
Congress designates as residing outside the formal boundaries of the federal government."
Cunningham, supra note 2, at 333.
19 See Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Home Page, littp://www.pcttbus.
org/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2006); see also 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. Ii 2003) (establishing the
PCAOB as a non-profit corporation); id. § 7219 (describing how the PCAOB is funded).
" See, e.g., Pun. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGIIT lit,., 2006 BUDGET, at 2 (2006), available at
http://www.pcaobus.org/About_the_PCAOB/Budget_Presentations/2006.pdf; see also 15
U.S.C. § 7219(b) (providing that the PCAOB's budget must be approved by the SEC).
21 PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT lin., 2005 ANNUM. RiToaT, at 27 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.pcaolms.org/About_the_PCAOB/Anntral_Reports/2005.pdf.
. 22 See 1 5 U.S.C. § 72 I 1(b) ("The [PCA0111 shall not be an agency or establishment of
the United States Government.").
21 See Policy Regarding Use of PCAOB Materials, http://www.pcaobus.org/Copyright .
aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2006),
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ernment. Moreover, somewhat ominously, the PCAOB explicitly states
that it might amend this policy from time to time and that it contin-
ues to assert copyright in its standards. 24
Imagine the following: Suppose Congress decides to reduce the
mandatory fees paid to the PCAOB, and provides instead that the
PCAOB can generate revenue from the sale of its copyrighted ac-
counting standards. Would the same alleged benefits associated with
the PCAOB's status as an allegedly strong form standards setter ac-
crue?
Probably not. Instead, the PCAOB would have overwhelming in-
centives to engage in both first-order and second-order activities with
respect to its accounting standards. First, it likely would charge private
parties for copies of its accounting standards. Those costs might not
be substantial, but the PCAOB probably would not make such stan-
dards available for free, as it does now. The PCAOB would be particu-
lady unlikely to provide its detailed policy statements and questions
and answers at no cost.°
Second, the PCAOB also would have incentives to leverage its
copyright into other areas. It might charge firms for advice as to how
they could comply with particular standards. Or it might offer to cer-
tify financial statements as being in compliance with PCAOB stan-
dards, for a fee. if the government enacted a system in which the
PCAOB determined whether a company was in compliance, the
PCAOB's determinations would be far more valuable. In such a re-
gime, the PCAOB would be able to charge substantially higher fees.
From a policy perspective, these second-order actions seem more
problematic than first-order actions. It is one thing for an entity to
extract some extra fee income based on the fact that the government
deemed it to be a useful standard setter. It is quite another for the en-
tity to extract additional value from the government's grant of regula-
tory entitlements. These second-order activities are, at least arguably,
tainted by self-interest and perverse incentives.
24 Id.
25
 For an example of the PCAOB's policy statement and question and answer resources,
see Policy Statement, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Policy Statement Regard-
ing Implementation of Auditing Standard No. 2 (May 16, 2005), hup://www.pcaobus.org/
Rules/Docket_008/2005-05-16_Release_2005-009.pdf; Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, Stair Questions and Answers: Auditing Internal Control over Financial Reporting ( July
27, 2004), hup://www.pcatibus,org/StandaRis/Staff Questiots_And_Altswers/2004/06-23.
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The thought experiment is useful in pointing out why any bene-
fits accrue from the PCAOB's provision of standards. It is not because
the PCAOB is a strong form standard setter; rather, it is because the
PCAOB is a unique quasi-public, quasi-regulatory entity that has agreed
not to exploit its copyrights, at least for now.
Additionally, it is important to note that, in assessing the costs
and benefits associated with strong form standard setting, the private
or public nature of the relevant entity (or, if it is a hybrid entity, the
extent to which it has private versus public attributes) is of crucial im-
portance. Private for-profit entities are most likely to seek second-
order profits. Private not-for-profit entities still have incentives to pur-
sue these profits, but they are more likely to consider the public inter-
est (or perhaps their own idiosyncratic non-profit incentives). Public
entities, on the other hand, have an entirely different set of govern-
ment-driven incentives.
Professor Cunningham says that, in his tripartite categorization of
standards, copyright is not recognized in the strong Form area, while it
generally is recognized in the weak form area. 26 Semi-strong form copy-
right issues are on intermediate ground, and copyright might be rec-
ognized in some instances. 27 According to this formulation, the
PCAOB does not assert copyright to its standards because it is a strong
form standard setter. However, in reality the PCAOB does not assert
copyright for unique reasons that have little to do with its purported
strong form status. As the above discussion has illustrated, the scope of
copyright enforcement does not necessarily decline as the strength of
standard setting increases. Indeed, because the potential profitability of
standards copyrights increases as the strength of standard setting in-
creases, the relationship might be precisely the opposite.
B. Regulatory Licenses
In other works, I have discussed some of the issues relating to
government endorsement of standards in the context of credit rating
agencies, although without the benefit of standard-setting labeis. 28
Specifically, I have argued that government statutes and regulations
" Cunningham, supra note 2, at 313.
21 Id. at 314.
28 See generally Frank Portnoy, How and My Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gate-
keepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS 59, 64-68 (Thsmitki Fuchim & Robert E. Limn eds.,
2006) [hereinafter Portnoy, Credit Rating Agencies]; Frank Portnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of
Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619
(1999) [hereinafter Portnoy, Financial Markets].
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give an oligopoly right to a handful of credit rating agencies to de-
termine whether private actors are in compliance with regulation I
labeled this right a "regulatory license."" I now want to attempt to
generalize this concept.
If an applicable regulation imposes costs, and a favorable private
action eliminates or reduces those costs, then private actors will be able
to sell regulatory licenses to enable market participants to reduce their
costs. Private actors will sell regulatory licenses until the marginal cost
of acquiring and transferring regulatory licenses exceeds the marginal
benefit from payment by market participants. If the applicable regula-
tion enables only a few private actors to acquire and transfer regulatory
licenses, or if it imposes barriers to entry or other costs on new en-
trants, the private actors will acquire market power in the sale of regula-
tory licenses, and will be able to earn oligopoly profits.
The regulatory license view can be generalized to any area in
which the regulator privatizes a function by incorporating the stan-
dards of a fixed number of private actors into substantive regulation.
For example, suppose the government is concerned about the quality
of a consumer product. 31
 Individuals, who also arc concerned about
quality, might undertake search costs to determine the quality of each
product they are considering purchasing, but it is more efficient for
groups of purchasers to pay a certifier to assess the products. There is
a free-rider problem associated with the nature of the certifier's as-
sessment as a public good, although this problem can be solved in
part by having sellers pay the certifier directly and then pass the cost
of certification on to the purchaser.
Suppose a private company has been formed to certify product
quality. Purchasers will rely on the company's ratings only to the ex-
tent they are accurate and credible. Over time, if the company pub-
lishes accurate assessments, it will accumulate reputational capital,
which will lead buyers to trust the assessments in making their pur-
chases. If the company is able to sustain the accuracy of its assess-
men ts, it will increase its stock of reputational capital.
Suppose the cost to the company of assessing or certifying a
product is equal to C<M>. Further suppose the expected benefit to
purchasers from obtaining a rating is equal to B, and the aggregate
cost to purchasers of certification is equal to C<P> E C<p>, p=l,
29
 See Partuoy, Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 28, at 60.
3° See id. at 82: Pam toy, Financial Almketsc, supra note 28, at 623, 681.
31
 The following discussion and hypothetical are drawn from Partnoy, Financial Mar-
kets, supra note 28, at 683-85.
20071	 Second-Order Benefits from Standards	 181
. , n (where n = number of purchasers). Purchasers, either directly
or indirectly through sellers, will pay for a rating if B is greater than
CCP>, and the company will provide a rating at a price between B
and CCM>. In a competitive market, the company will be able to
charge only C<M>. If the company is a monopolist, it will be able to
charge B.
If the company is constrained by its reputation and has no regu-
latory licenses, the quality of the product should be closely related to
the ratings. If it is not, B will decline, and purchasers will not be will-
ing to pay for the ratings (alternatively, the rater will not be able to
charge a price high enough to cover its costs).
Now suppose the government promulgates a rule stating that
purchasers can buy only products with a particular level of certifica-
tion (for instance, Grade A). At first, the government considers sup-
plying certifications on its own, but eventually decides that a private
entity would be able to certify at a lower cost and without the burdens
of a government bureaucracy. Initially, the government does not im-
pose limitations on who may provide a certification, but due to safety
or other prudential concerns, the government decides to allow only
approved assessors to certify the products.
These decisions by the government have two effects. First, they
give approved certifiers market power in providing their assessments.
This will result in an increase in the cost of certification, C<P>, which
will be passed on to purchasers in the form of an increase in the cost of
the product. There will be deadweight losses of the type typically asso-
ciated with monopoly or market power. The severity of these losses and
the magnitude of the increased costs will depend on the number of
approved certifiers and the severity of the barriers to entry.
Second, the government's decision to delegate the certification
of products removes some of the reputational constraints on the cer-
tification business. The assessing company need not worry excessively
about its reputation and, consequently, may give certifications to
lower quality products (in other words, the portion of the value of B
attributable to the certifier providing information may decline), so
long as it is able to retain its status as a government-approved certifier.
Now, the limitation on the certifiers' behavior is not the certifiers'
reputation in the market; it is the certifiers' reputation—or level of
influence—with the government.
Suppose sellers would like to begin selling lower quality products,
which have lower costs. In a competitive market, the certifying com-
pany could not risk certifying such products because of concerns
about losing reputational capital. Now, in contrast, the company can
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certify lower quality products, so long as the government does not re-
voke its status as an approved certifier. If there are close substitutes to
the products that the government would be unlikely to detect, then
the rating company can give those products a positive assessment, at a
higher rating cost.
As the number of regulations depending on approved certifica-
tions grows, approved raters become both more powerful and more
profitable (in other words, B increases, despite the fact that the asses-
sors are providing little informational value). The assessors' reputa-
tions may tarnish, so long as their approval status remains. Eventually,
political pressure on regulators, perhaps from public outcry over the
deterioration in product quality, may lead to regulatory changes, al-
though if the approved raters can earn sufficient profits to pay the
regulators to maintain approval status—indirectly through campaign
contributions, or even directly through bribes—certifiers may be able
to remain in a position of profit and power indefinitely.
The above theory of regulatory licenses may explain the growth
of certain types of certification agencies (for instance, religious die-
tary certifiers), and may indicate some of the risks of privatizations in
which the government remains involved in monitoring the private
entities. On the other hand, the theory also is consistent with the view
that certain private raters are able to accumulate and retain reputa-
tional capital and provide a valuable certification function over a long
period of time without governmental regulation (for instance, Con-
sumer Reports magazine or the Zagat restaurant guides).
Regulatory license theory suggests that one of the drawbacks to
standard strength is the increased cost associated with the grant of
regulatory licenses. Put simply, weak form standard setters receive
weak regulatory licenses, whereas strong form standard setters receive
strong ones. Of course, strong form standard setters might generate
other benefits. However, to the extent regulatory licenses matter,
strong form standards are likely to generate greater costs, particularly
if the regulatory licenses are awarded to private non-profit entities.
This last point is significant. The type of entity that is setting stan-
dards matters crucially to optimal standard designation policy. If the
government designates a quasi-public or public entity to set standards,
it will not need to control that entity's behavior explicitly. For exam-
ple, if the entity agrees not to enforce its copyright in the relevant
standards, as the PCAOB has done for now, that agreement may be
enough to keep the entity in check. The task is more difficult for pri-
vate entities, although the government might impose the same kinds
of restrictions on private standard setters that it has sought from the
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PCAOB. In exchange for receiving a regulatory license, the standard
setter would have to agree to certain restrictions on its ability to ex-
ploit the standards. Specifically, the government might attempt to re-
strict the entity's ability to extract second-order profits from the stan-
dard. The entity's reward for creating quality standards would be
limited to the first-order rents it could extract from charging for ac-
cess to the standards. Alternatively, the government could subsidize
the entity and require that it provide standards-related information at
no cost.
One prominent example, which fits regulatory license theory, at
least in part, is Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. ("UL"). 32 In Novem-
ber 1901, some insurance companies established UL to provide uni-
form testing of various types of appliances and to generate credible
information about hazards associated with the tested products." UL
began providing labels for approved products, and, by the early 1920s,
consumers were relying on these labels in assessing the safety of prod-
ucts. Once companies realized consumers were depending on the UL
labels, they began developing products with a view to secure the UL
As of the 1920s, UL was a non-profit organization that was not
supported by regulation and did not favor particular manufacturers;
consequently, its labels were credible." By the 1990s, UL had become
a giant in safety certification, employing 3900 people and testing
75,000 products; the UL mark appears on more than six billion new
products each year. 36
Reputation alone, however, does not entirely explain UL's role,
and, in certain respects, the regulatory license view is more accurate.
In recent years, regulations have been promulgated that relate to the
32 This discussion is drawn from Nanny, Financial Markets, supra note 28, at 685-86.
35 See Harry Chase Brearly, A Symbol of Safety: The Origins of Underwriters Laboratories, in
REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CoNoucr 75. 77-79
(Daniel B. Klein ed., 1997) [hereinafter REPUTATION STUDIES].
35 Once the manufacturer of the product becomes involved in securing the rating,
there is ample opportunity for bribery and collusion. Brearly describes one instance of an
excited manufacturer giving each of four engineers a $1000 watch after his product passed
the required tests. Id. at 82. The engineers notified the UL President, and "after a stormy
hour in the private office, the manufficturer left, carrying his four watches, and never
thereafter attempted to repeat his offense." Id.
35 Brearly noted, "As a result. the labels of Underwriters' Laboratories mean something.
They are recognized as incontrovertible evidence that the goods which bear them really
possess the qualities of their rating." Id. at 83.
36 See Daniel B. Klein, Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies firr Quality and Safety, in REI'um-
TION Srunt ES, supra note 33, at 97, 114-15.
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UL mark. For example, one incentive for manufacturers to use the
UL mark is insulation against liability. 37
 Another explanation is that
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") has
specified UL (and also the Factory Mutual Research Corporation
("FMRC")) as an authorized independent testing and certifying or-
ganization for certain OSHA procedures. Daniel Klein has described
this specification as resulting in an "OSHA monopoly" for UL and
FMRC." More recent OSHA guidelines have opened the business of
certifying to "nationally recognized testing laboratories" and have
specified how OSHA would approve such laboratories."
Generally, the impetus for the regulation of raters, including UL,
is the same as the impetus for the flexible, market-based regulation
that has contributed to the privatization of so many previously public
activities and industries in the last fifteen years. However, when the
regulator retains the power to approve of raters, such privatization
may lead to second-order inefficiencies of greater consequence than
those of the original, inefficient regime. Second-best economics sug-
gests that privatization may be sub-optimal for various reasons. Regu-
lators, wittingly or not, may try to assist the raters in a manner that
creates market power and moral hazard for raters. Subsidization of
raters, even if indirect, may exacerbate market failure. Purchasers of
ratings may face rater oligopolies, monopolies, or the potential of
moral hazard. Approved raters are sheltered from new entrants and
from foreign competition. This protection eliminates the incentive to
maintain quality ratings. Consequently, the regulatory license view
suggests that certain activities should not be privatized if markets are
to function properly. At a minimum, regulators should account for
second-order costs.
SOME EXAMPLES FROM FINANCIAL MARKETS
There are numerous examples of each of the categories of stan-
dards in the financial markets. A full treatment is beyond the scope of
this Article, but it is worth noting that Professor Cunningham's tax-
onomy fits the financial markets nicely. Professors Cunningham and
Bratton have addressed various issues that arise from ownership of
57 See id. at 115.
38 See id. at 115 n.32.
39 See Definition and Requirements Sro a Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory, 29
C.F.R. § 1910.7 (2005); OSHA Recognition Process for Nationally Recognized Testing Lbo-
ratories, vi. § 1910.7 app. A.
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weak and semi-strong form standards in the financial markets.° Firms
try to appropriate the value of their models, but once the models be-
come public it is difficult. There are numerous examples of private
actors trying to capture the value of standards in the Financial mar-
kets, including a substantial increase in filings for patents on financial
innovation and the proliferation of copyright assertions on financial
documents (even securities lawyers now assert copyright protection
for the complaints they file).
Section 1.0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives rise to
weak form standards to the extent it refers to private conduct. 41 In-
dustry practice is important in deciding cases. Notions of corporate
governance also derive from private conduct. Individual law firms use
standard form agreements based on the promulgation of federal
regulators.
Semi-strong standards have included, most prominently, gener-
ally accepted accounting principles. Other examples include standard
form securities documents, merger agreements, industry standards of
conduct, suitability standards, and certain standardized data services,
including private and exchange-based indices (such as 1SDAFIX). It is
unclear whether this expansion of protection adds value, but that is a
topic beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, this paper focuses on strong form standards. There are
more strong form standards than one might first imagine. Indeed,
corporate law itself arguably consists of a set of strong firm standards,
whereby the legislature empowers individual corporations by setting
forth a set of default rules, but permitting private parties to supplant.
those rules with their own terms. Every company is in some sense its
own strong form standard setter.
The two types of standards I wish to focus on in this Article in-
volve over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives and credit rating agencies.
A. OTC Derivatives
I have written elsewhere about the International Swaps and De-
rivatives Association ("ISDA") and the OTC derivatives market, and I
will not repeat that level of detail here. 42 ISDA is a global trade asso-
40 See generally Bratton, supra note 6; Cunningham, supra note 2.
"L See Securities Exchange Act or 1934 §10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (2000).
42 SA? FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CoRRurrEn THE Ft-
NANCIAL MARKETS 46-47, 52, 61, 142, 148, 151-52, 154, 397-98 (2003) [hereinafter PART-
NOV, INFECTIOUS GREED]; Frank Partiloy, ISIM, NASD, (TAM, and SDNY: The Four Homemen
Dmivasities Regulation?, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERvit.-.Es 213, 213-25
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ciation that represents the leading market participants in the OTC
derivatives inclustry. 43
 ISDA promulgates standards and standard-form
documentation for the vast majority of OTC derivatives transactions.
In terms of notional value, ISDA is the source of standards related to a
greater value of transactions than any other standard-setting organiza-
tion , 44
Some evidence suggests that ISDA standards are extremely weak.
ISDA is not referenced in any federal statute, 45
 and is mentioned in
just three regulations, for purposes that have little to do with the pri-
mary source of the value of ISDA standards. 46
 The statutory exemp-
tions for OTC derivatives do not mention ISDA, although ISDA
played a prominent role as a lobbyist pushing for these exemptions. 47
Ultimately, Congress cemented the status of OTC derivatives as
unregulated and outside federal jurisdiction in the Commodity Fu-
tures Modernization Act of 2000 (the "CFMA").
(Richard Herring & Robert E. Limn eds., 2002); Frank Parinoy, The Shifting Contours of Global
Derivatives Rtgulation, 22 U. PA. J. INVI ECON. L. 421, 429-42 (2001).
45 See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, hit. Home Page, lutp://www.
isda.org
 (last visited Oct. 5, 2006),
4 ' 4
 According to the Bank fbr International Settlements,. there was approximately $285
trillion notional worth of total OTC derivatives contracts outstanding as of the end of 2005.
.tim Bank for International Settlements, Table 19: Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter
(01'C) Derivatives by Risk Category and Instrument, littp://imw.bis.org/statistics/otcder/
dt1920a.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
45
 A search of the United States Code electronic database on LEXIS on September 7,
2006 revealed no references to ISDA or the International Swaps and Derivatives Associa-
tion.
46 See 12 C.F.R. § 956.6 (2006) (providing that standard ISDA language may be used to
satisfy certain documentation requirements for Federal Home Loan Bank use of derivative
instruments); 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-4(a) (3) (ii) (2006) (mentioning an ISDA agreement as an
example of a 'master agreement that governs the transactions in notional principal con-
tracts between the parties"); id. § 1.6041-4 (same).
47
 PARTsrvw, /NFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 42, at 152-54. Specifically, although OTC
derivatives can have the characteristics of "securities" or "futures," those instruments are
regulated under separate statutory regimes. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § la(31) (2000) (defining
"security future"); id. § 2(a) (2) (establishing the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion); 15 U.S.C. § 771)(a) (1) (2000 & Stipp. II 2003) (defining "security"). Indeed, regula-
tory competition between the SEC (which regulates "securities") and the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission (which regulates "Enures") led to an extended turf battle over
OTC derivatives, which resulted—not in some optimal regulatory regime, as might have
been predicted by advocates of regulatory competition—but rather in a heated dispute
and stalemate, which was resolved in part when Congress banned certain derivatives con-
tracts as illegal and unenforceable. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000).
46
 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106•554, § I (a) (5), 119
Star. 2763, 2763A-365 (codified in scattered sections of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (Supp. II 2003)); w also S. 2697, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 4541, 10601
Cong. (2000).
48
 The CFMA does not
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reference ISDA, however. Instead, because it simply exempts OTC
derivatives contracts from regulation, it leaves these instruments sub-
ject to private contracting, however such contracting might arise.
Notwithstanding the absence of ISDA from the CFMA, one might
argue that Congress implemented a de facto strong standards regime,
relying on ISDA, based on ISDA's dominance at the time. Judicial re-
liance on ISDA standards would support such a strong interpretation.
More than eighty published cases have relied on ISDA in reaching
decisions. 49
Moreover, numerous statutes and regulations rely on certain pro-
visions that are incorporated into standard form OTC derivatives coun-
terparty contracts, even though they do not explicitly reference ISDA.
For example, ISDA standard form documents provide that OTC de-
rivatives payments will be netted and will fall outside the bankruptcy
estate in the event of a counterparty default. 5° Such reliance on ISDA
terms, albeit not explicitly reliance on ISDA, is a sign that ISDA stan-
dards are very strong.
In analyzing ISDA-related standards, the strength of the stan-
dards matters less than the strength of the copyright. In this case,
ISDA's copyright assertion is extremely strong. It charges fees for all
of its documents and restricts access to information related to those
documents. 51 In providing information, ISDA strongly, favors its
dealer members over the public and end users. 52
Although ISDA generates significant first-order profits from the
sale of its standardized documents, the most substantial profits related
to ISDA standards have been the second-order profits of its members.
ISDA members benefit from being able to sell OTC derivatives in a
largely unregulated market, and not only because they receive contrac-
49 There were eighty-five cases referencing ISDA based on a search of the LEXIS Fed-
eral & State Cases, Combined database on September 25, 2006.
5° For excellent discussions of the relationship between ISDA contracts and bank-
ruptcy rules, with particular references to netting, see Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R.
Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 VALET ON REG.
01, 97 (2005); Edward R. Morrison & Juerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bank-
ruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from iianitrupt Debtors and Bankrupay judges, 13 AM. BANKII,
INST. L. REV. 641, 649-52 (2005).
51 See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Online Bookstore, Intps1/
www.isdadomorg/cgi-bin/indexbookstoreimul (last visited Oct. 5, 2006).
52 See ISDA Home Page, http://www.isdadocs.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2006) (follow
"Membership" hyperlink) (describing infOrmation available exclusively to ISDA members).
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tual preferences in the event of bankruptcy. Members also receive very
substantial benefits associated with standard form documentation."
ISDA's role has been controversial, and some courts have found
that ISDA's approach benefited dealers to the detriment of their cus-
tomers. 54 However, my point here is not to decide the policy question
of whether the benefits from ISDA's special place as a standard setter
are worth the cost." Instead, my point is that this policy question
hinges crucially on second-order benefits and costs. Of course, ISDA
directly profits from selling standard-form documents, and those first-
order profits certainly are relevant. Unlike the PCAOB, ISDA is
funded voluntarily by dealers, and its first-order profits help it sustain
a costly operation. However, ISDA develops and uses standards pri-
marily because of their second-order effects. The debate should focus
on ISDA's much more substantial second-order profits and costs, and
the extent to which these profits and costs affect both ISDA's dealer
members and their customers.
B. Bond Credit Rating Agencies
A second category of financial market standards relates to bond
credit ratings. Bond credit rating agencies provide ratings divided
into categories, based on the perceived credit quality of the rated
financial instrument. 56 Generally, a bond rating was intended to indi-
cate the likelihood of default or delayed payment for that bond. 57 As
with many ratings, the historical practice was to assign the letter A or
the number 1 to the highest grade, with Al signifying a high, if not
55 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitt Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 Mimi. L. REv. 1129,
1139-42 (2006). 1SDA's record in developing standard-Form documents has been subject
to extensive criticism, including pointed remarks by Alan Greenspan, one of the most
prominent and ardent supporters of arc derivatives markets. See, e.g., Richard Beales et
al., Banks Fare Further Regulatory Pressure on Derivative Thading, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at
I.
54 See, e.g., Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375
F.3(1 168, 178 (2(1 Cir. 2004) (reversing judgment dismissing plaintifFs claim that 1SDA
documentation was ambiguous); Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3(1312, 328-29 (2d Cir.
2002) (rejecting defendant's claim that a disclaimer in its ISDA documents barred plaintiff
From suing based oil defelidalleS misrepresentations).
55 I have argued elsewhere that there are reasons to be concerned about the negative
effects of 1SDA's monopoly. See PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 42, at 151-55,
397-98.
56 See Timonivi. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING
AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS 36-39 (2005) (providing a summary
of bond rating symbols and definitions).
57 Id. at 7.
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the highest, grade." Relative rankings, in descending order, would be
B or 2, then C or 3, and so on.
The dominant rating agencies (for instance, Standard & Poor's
and Moody's) use similar scales, with each agency employing both or-
dinal (for instance, A, B, C) and cardinal (for instance, Aaa, Aa, A) rat-
ings. 59 Each agency uses three subcategories for each broad rating cate-
gory (for instance, three levels of "As," three levels of "Bs," and so
on)."
Credit rating agencies can earn first-order and/or second-order
profits. Before the 1970s, most agencies earned only first-order
profits, by selling their ratings to investors. 61 During this time, the
credit rating industry was small and not particularly profitable. Nor
was there extensive regulation related to credit ratings.
In contrast, during the period from 1973 to the present, credit
ratings have been incorporated into hundreds of rules, releases, and
regulations, in various substantive areas, including securities, pension,
banking, real estate, and insurance regulation. The cascade of regula-
tion began in 1973 when, following the credit crises of the early 1970s,
the SEC adopted Rule 15c3-1, the first securities rule formally incor-
porating credit . ratings and thereby approving the use of certain credit
rating agencies as Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organiza-
tions ("NRSROs"). 62 Rule 15c3-1 set forth certain broker-dealer "hair-
cut" requirements, and required a different haircut for securities
based on credit ratings assigned by NRSROs. 65
Since 1973, there have been credit-rating dependent rules and
regulations promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and
various banking regulations. NRSROs even have been cited in federal
district court opiniOns. I have documented the growth of ratings-
based regulation elsewhere."
I will not attempt to summarize all of the legal rules that depend
on NRSROs. Instead, the chart set forth below gives some indication of
68 Id. at 36-39.
59 Id.
6° Id.
61 See generally Partnoy, Financial Markets, supra note 28.
62 17 C.F,R. § 240.15c3-I (2006).
63 Id. § 240.15c3-1(c) (2) (vi).
" See generally Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 28: Partnoy, Financial Markets,
supra note 28; Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES
AND 7111 GLOBAL FINANCIAL. SysTEM 65, 65-95 (Richard M. Levitch et ai. eds., 2002).
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the number and location of these rules. There are both statutes and
regulations that depend on NRSRO credit ratings, in various areas.
CFR Statute
Agriculture (Title 7) 3 0
Banks and Banking (Title 12) 34 3
Commerce and Trade (Title 15) 0 0
Commodity and Securities (Title 17) 30 2
Education (Titles 20, 34) I I
Transportation ('Titles 23, 49) 1 1
Telecom (Title 47) 0 1
Total 09 8
Where do credit rating agencies fit within Professor Cunningham's
regime? One argument is that because the rating agencies are not ex-
plicitly mentioned in statutes or regulation, their standards arc weak
fOrm. On the other hand, although the agencies are not mentioned
directly, the federal government has explicitly designated a group of
entities, the NRSROs, as the standard setters. It is up to the NRSROs to
decide ratings and to publish their methodologies. Through the no-
action process, the SEC has effectively anointed a handful of agencies
as strong standard setters.
There is extensive evidence that the NRSROs have extracted very
substantial first-order and second-order profits. 65 Rating agencies
have operating margins in the range of fifty percent, and Moody's
Corporation, the one NRSRO with publicly traded shares, has a mar-
ket capitalization of roughly $20 billion and financial ratios that sug-
gest it is far inure profitable than any financial publisher. 66
The NRSROs' second-order actions are arguably of even greater
cost. First, the NRSROs face serious conflicts of interest: they continue
to be paid directly by issuers, they give unsolicited ratings that at least
potentially pressure issuers to pay them lees, and they market ancil-
lary consulting services related to ratings. Credit rating agencies in-
creasingly fOcus on structured finance and new complex debt prod-
ucts, particularly credit derivatives, which now generate a substantial
share of credit rating agency revenues and profits. With respect to
these new instruments, the agencies' standard setting has created and
sustained a multi-trillion dollar market.
65 See Partnoy, Credit Bating Agencies, ROM note 28, at 64-68.
66 Id. at 66.
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As with the discussion of OTC derivatives, my point here is not to
resolve the policy debate about credit rating agencies. Instead, my
point is that in the taxonomy of standards, the crucial benefits and
costs are second-order, not first-order. Indeed, credit rating agencies
arc an example of standard setters that began in a first-order regime,
profiting directly by charging investors, and then switched to a sec-
ond-order regime, profiting indirectly by charging debt issuers (and
in other ways). The shift was a dramatic one: it generated oligopoly
rents for the agencies, derived from the benefits associated with regu-
latory licenses, and it led to policy challenges that did not exist in the
previous first-order world.
CONCLUSION
There is no single lens through which to examine standards. The
strength of the standard matters, but so does the strength of any at-
tendant copyright. Likewise, whether the standard setter is a private
or public entity, or some hybrid thereof, will affect the calculus of ex-
pected costs and benefits. As the new governance literature suggests,
private entities can he more efficient and public-private partnerships
can generate synergies, but one must keep in mind that private end-
ties naturally will seek profits, including monopoly profits from the
exploitation of standards.
In this Article, I have attempted to contribute to the literature by
arguing that scholars should distinguish between two types of actions
parties might take in exploiting standards: first-order actions resemble
typical monopoly rents, whereas second-order actions resemble a kind
of tying, and can generate much greater profit, as well as serious con-
flicts of interest and regulatory challenges. Second-order incentives
are especially acute when standards are strong and the standard setter
is a purely private actor, as is the case with ISDA and credit rating
agencies. Regimes that give private entities regulatory licenses while
adopting strong form standards are likely to generate substantial
costs. One might conclude that these costs are justified, but the analy-
sis should focus on what I have called second-order activities.
